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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, :i 
v. 1 Case No- 970275-CA 
JAMES REDD AND JEANNE REDD, s Priority No. 2 
Defendants/Appellees. s 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals an order of the district court dismissing 
an information charging one count of abuse or desecration of a 
dead human body, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-9-704 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-18a-l(2) (a) (1995) and 78-
2a-3(2) (e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVTEW 
After finding probable cause to believe that defendants 
disinterred human remains from an Anasazi archaeological site, 
did the preliminary hearing court err by refusing to bind 
defendants over on charges of abuse or desecration of a dead 
1 
human body, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704? 
The court's interpretation of a statute presents a question 
of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 
1355, 1357 (Utah 1993) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1995) is found in addendum A. 
The two earlier versions of the same statute are cited in the 
body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants were charged in separate informations with one 
count each of abuse or desecration of a dead human body, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1), and 
one count each of trespassing on school trust lands, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53C-2-301(l)(f) 
(Supp. 1994) (R. 1-2)-1 Following a preliminary hearing, the 
court refused to bind over, dismissed the felony charge against 
each defendant, and stayed the misdemeanor proceedings (R. 48-50 
or addendum B). The State then timely appealed the dismissal of 
1
 Record citations are to State v. James Redd, district 
court case no. 9617-229. Many of the same documents also appear 
in the record for the companion case, State v. Jeanne Redd, 
district court case no. .9617-230. This Court granted the state's 
motion to consolidate the two cases for purposes of appeal. 
2 
the felony charges (R. 59-60) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the afternoon of January 6, 1996, Ben Naranjo of the San 
Juan County Sheriff's Office was contacted by dispatch and told 
that Mike Pehrson, a resident of Bluff, wanted to talk to him "as 
soon as possible'' (R. 69). Naranjo immediately went to Pehrson's 
home, where Pehrson informed him that he and his stepson, while 
hiking, had observed several people digging in an area known to 
contain Anasazi ruins (R. 70). Pehrson said he had observed 
similar activity in the same area on several previous occasions 
as well. Erv Guymon, who was present when Naranjo arrived and 
who owned property in the area Pehrson described, told Naranjo 
that "if it was on his property, nobody had permission at that 
time to be on there" (R. 70). 
Naranjo, with Pehrson accompanying him, then drove to the 
dig site, located about five miles outside of Bluff, up a dirt 
road in South Cottonwood Canyon (R. 70, 82).2 As they approached 
the site, they observed a pickup truck with vanity license plates 
reading *ANASAZI." Three children were standing near the vehicle 
2
 According to Naranjo, Cottonwood Canyon was generally 
known around Bluff as Guymon's property. The canyon was accessed 
by a single, gated road (R. 78). Pehrson lived just below the 
gate (R. 79). 
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(R. 71). Naranjo asked the children if there was any digging 
going on, and they responded that there was, but that they were 
on Erv Guymon's property with his permission (R. 71). 
Defendants then came running down from the dig site, which 
was located up a little hill, out of sight, and asked Naranjo why 
he was there and what he was doing (R. 71). When Naranjo 
explained that someone had observed them digging, defendants 
asked for details, claiming that Erv Guymon had given them 
permission some three weeks earlier to be on the property (R. 
72). During this conversation, Phil Hall, who ran what defendant 
James Redd described to Naranjo as "that liberal democratic 
newspaper down in Bluff," drove up. Agitated by Hall's presence, 
defendant said to Naranjo, "Get him out of here. I don't want to 
speak with him" (R. 73). At this juncture, Naranjo decided to 
"just back off and go talk to Mr. Guymon and ask him about 
permission to be on his property" (Id.).3 
Later investigation established that the dig site was on 
state land (R. 97). An archaeologist from the Bureau of Land 
3
 Despite his earlier disclaimer (R. 70), Erv Guymon later 
told Naranjo that he remembered giving defendants permission to 
be on the land, but not to dig. In any event, Guymon said that 
he and James Redd were friends, and that he would take care of 
the matter (R. 74). 
4 
Management described the site and the indications of digging that 
he observed three days after the confrontation with defendants: 
The site itself consisted of a building that 
was about 30 feet across and sort of a north-
to- south access with a courtyard in front and 
a kiva to the south, and east of that, a 
midden area and there was a large rectangular 
hole that had been -- been dug into that 
midden, and the resulting back dirt from that 
excavation was piled in the immediate 
vicinity of the --of the hole. 
(R. 100). The archaeologist opined that the digging was very 
recent.4 He found 13-15 bones, "generally within very close 
proximity to those areas of. . . dirt that had been recently 
screened, as if they had been on screen there [sic] and sort of 
tossed out'' (R. 103) . The archaeologist stated, *I felt very 
strongly that they were human remains" (Id.). 
Based on these facts, defendants were charged with abuse or 
desecration of a dead human body, a third degree felony, and 
trespass on trust lands, a class B misdemeanor (R. 1-2). After 
hearing the preliminary hearing evidence, the court found 
4
 This opinion was based on the archaeologist's observation 
that won the back dirt piles . . . where the screens had been 
laid that were. . . used to process the dirt [J. . . [y]ou could 
still see the impressions of . . . the screens on the dirt and . 
• . because . . . no rain had taken place, the dirt was very soft 
. . .[and] that kind of. information would have blown away very 
quickly" (R. 101). 
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probable cause to believe both that defendants had trespassed on 
school trust lands and that they had disturbed or disinterred 
human remains (R. 109 or addendum C). Nonetheless, the court 
refused to bind over on the felony charge, citing in both its 
oral and written orders a single reason for its decision. With 
no dispositive facts in dispute, the court dismissed the felony 
charge only because it thought that human remains were not 
intended to fall within the ambit of the controlling statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (R. 49 or addendum A; R. 109-11 or 
addendum C). Anticipating an appeal, the court held the trespass 
charge in abeyance for six months, for a status conference as to 
the felony charge (R. 49). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The preliminary hearing court found probable cause to 
believe that defendants had disinterred human remains from a 
known Anasazi archaeological site. However, the court then made 
an error of statutory interpretation, incorrectly determining 
that Anasazi bones do not fall within the ambit of section 76-9-
704, governing abuse or desecration of a dead human body. Since 
the court openly acknowledged the ambiguity inherent in section 
76-9-704, this Court should appropriately look to the legislative 
history and purpose of the statute to determine its fair meaning. 
6 
The policy underlying the law is two-fold: to secure "unbroken 
final repose" for the dead and to prevent desecration of the dead 
for pecuniary gain. Interpreting Mead human body" in light of 
these purposes leads to the conclusion that as long as the 
disinterring is done intentionally and unlawfully, the condition 
of the disinterred dead should not be dispositive. Indeed, where 
the evidence showed that defendants were intentionally and 
unlawfully digging in a known Anasazi burial site and where they 
disinterred human bones, their acts fell well within the historic 
purposes of section 76-9-704. 
Furthermore, the preliminary hearing court's ruling renders 
section 76-9-704 internally inconsistent and at odds with other 
relevant statutes. First, if subsection (1), defining the 
unlawful conduct, involves only Mead human bodies," then the 
exception for the Antiquities Act in subsection (2) becomes 
irrelevant, because the Antiquities Act addresses conduct 
involving "remains," which the preliminary hearing court saw as a 
category entirely separate from "dead human bodies." And second, 
a related statute, the Native American Grave Protection Act 
("NAGPRA"), defines "remains" as "all or part of a physical 
individual." Because NAGPRA and section 76-9-704 have common 
purposes, they should be interpreted harmoniously. 
7 
Finally, public policy dictates that all human remains be 
treated with respect, regardless of whether they are interred in 
ways customary to the dominant culture or in ways little 
understood by some modern peoples. The act to be criminalized is 
a knowing and intentional disinterment. The particular condition 
of the remains should be irrelevant. 
ARGUMENT 
PQINT ONE 
THE TERM "DEAD HUMAN BODY" AS USED 
IN SECTION 76-9-704, WHEN VIEWED IN 
LIGHT OF THE INTENT AND PURPOSE OF 
THE STATUTE, PROPERLY INCLUDES THE 
ANASAZI BONES THAT DEFENDANTS 
DISINTERRED FROM A KNOWN ANASAZI 
BURIAL SITE 
Defendants were charged with one count each of desecration 
of a dead human body, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-
704 (1), which provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of abuse or 
desecration of a dead human body if the 
person intentionally and unlawfully: 
(a) removes, conceals, fails to 
report the finding of a dead body 
to a local law enforcement agency, 
or destroys a dead body or any part 
of it; 
(b) disinters a buried or otherwise 
interred dead body, without 
authority of a court order; 
8 
(c) dismembers a dead body to any 
extent, or damages or detaches any 
part or portion of a dead body; or 
(d) commits, or attempts to commit 
upon any dead body sexual 
penetration. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1) (1995). 
Although the preliminary hearing court found probable cause 
to believe that defendants disinterred human remains, it 
nonetheless dismissed the third degree felony charges against 
them because it believed that the statute under which they had 
been charged, which used the term Mead human body," did not 
include the prehistoric bones that defendants unearthed from an 
identified archaeological site (R. 110-11 or addendum C ) . 
The court, in orally articulating the thought process 
underlying its ultimate ruling, outlined the ambiguity inherent 
in interpreting whether the term Mead human body" as used in 
section 76-9-704 included prehistoric bones. The court first 
stated: 
[T]here's one school of thought that it 
doesn't matter how old the remains are, 
they're still human remains, and they need to 
be protected from being disturbed. . . . 
[T]hese people probably have descendants 
living today who care that they be treated 
with respect. The descendants of these 
people probably are the Pueblo Indians, if --
if any descendants exist. 
9 
(R. 109-10 or addendum C). The court then laid out an opposing 
interpretation for Mead human body," as used in section 76-9-
704: 
The other school of thought is . . . there's 
a rule of reason that has to apply here, 
we're talking about disturbing human remains 
that have been buried in a place that's been 
set aside for the preserving of human 
remains, the cemetery, and -- and there has 
to be a certain point when we can't . . . 
hold people guilty for a . . . third degree 
felony because they . . . don't avoid all of 
these remains[, which] are scattered all over 
this part of the country. 
(R. 110 or addendum C). 
Having recognized these two opposing interpretations, the 
court then candidly acknowledged the ambiguity inherent in the 
statute: "And I don't know -- really I don't know the answer to 
the question. There's these two philosophies, both of them . . . 
legitimate and entitled to respect" (R. 110 or addendum C).5 
5
 The court also revealed an additional, pragmatic 
underpinning for its ruling: 
[I]f I dismiss the charges, fail to bind 
over, then the state could take an appeal, 
the Supreme Court can tell us what the law is 
on this case, and . • . we won't be 
disturbing the citizens of the county, we 
won't be putting Dr. and Mrs. Redd to the 
trauma of a trial without knowing that that's 
what the law is, by an authoritative source. 
And what I think about this isn't gonna 
10 
This Court has previously noted that Ms]tatutory language 
is ambiguous if it can reasonably be understood to have more than 
one meaning." B.L. Key, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 934 P.2d 
1164, 1166 (Utah App. 1997)(citation omitted). Here, the court 
was plainly troubled by the ambiguity inherent in the controlling 
statute. Under such circumstances, a reviewing court is 
warranted in looking beyond a plain language interpretation. See 
World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp.. 879 p.2d 253, 259 
(Utah 1994)("Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain 
language need we seek guidance from the legislative history and 
relevant policy considerations"); State v. Valdez, 933 P.2d 400, 
401-02 (Utah App. 1997)(expressing willingness to resort to 
legislative history and purpose for guidance when plain language 
of statute is unclear); State v. Vigil. 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 
1992)(looking to other methods of statutory interpretation when 
the language of a statute is ambiguous). 
matter when the Court of Appeals or the 
Supreme Court reviews this. . . . [T]hey will 
give my decision no deference whatsoever. 
(R. Ill or addendum C). Thus, although the court ultimately 
dismissed the felony charges, it was sufficiently troubled by the 
facial ambiguity of the statute that it further justified its 
ruling with an acknowledgement that dismissal might be more 
expedient for the county and for defendants. 
11 
1. The legislative history and purposes of section 76-9-704 
mandate an interpretation that includes Anasazi bones within 
the ambit of the law. 
The ambiguity expressed by the preliminary hearing court in 
this case is resolved by taking a broader approach to statutory 
interpretation. By so doing, the goals of statutory 
interpretation are well served: 
"'The primary rule of statutory 
interpretation is to give effect to the 
intent of the legislature in light of the 
purpose the statute was meant to achieve.'" 
Sullivan v, Secular Grain Co> of Utah/ 853 
P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993)(quoting Reeves v. 
fifiULllfi, 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991)). 
Although we generally rely on the plain 
language rule of statutory construction, id. 
at 879, we note that an equally important 
rule of statutory construction is that a 
statute should be construed as a whole, with 
all of its provisions construed to be 
harmonious with each other and with the 
overall legislative objective of the statute 
(citations omitted). 
Nivnn v. Salt Lake Citv Corp.. 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995). 
The statute governing abuse or desecration of a dead human 
body has its origins in two 1898 statutes, found in the chapter 
governing cemeteries: 
Disinterring dead bodies a felony.--Every 
person who mutilates, disinters, or removes 
from the place of sepulture, the dead body of 
a human being without authority of law is 
guilty of a felony. But the provisions of 
this section do not apply to any person who 
12 
removes the dead body of a relative or friend 
for reinterment, nor to any physician who 
shall make a post-mortem examination with the 
consent of relatives or friends of the 
deceased. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1 (1969). The next section provides in 
pertinent part: 
Selling or dissecting bodies a felony.--Every 
person who removes any part of the dead body 
of a human being from any grave or other 
place where the same has been buried . . . 
with intent to sell the same or to dissect it 
without authority of law, or from malice or 
wantonness, is punishable by imprisonment in 
the state prison not exceeding five years. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-2 (1969). 
These statutes, read in conjunction, plainly criminalized 
the acts of grave robbers. Any person who disinterred a dead 
human being or removed even a part of a human body from a grave 
in a cemetery was guilty of a felony, regardless of whether the 
intent was pecuniary or merely wanton. 
The policy underlying the law seems to be two-fold. First, 
the law sought to ensure that once buried, the dead would be left 
at rest, both out of respect for the deceased and for their 
descendants: 
This idea is so deeply woven into our legal 
and cultural fabric that it is commonplace to 
hear it spoken of as a *right" of the dead 
and a charge on the quick. Neither the 
13 
ecclesiastical, common, nor civil system of 
jurisprudence permits exhumation for less 
than what are considered weighty, and 
sometimes compelling, reasons. Securing 
"unbroken final repose" has been the object 
of both civil and criminal legislation. 
21 A.L.R. 2d 472, 476 (1952). Second, the laws sought to 
discourage desecration of the interred dead for pecuniary gain: 
From time immemorial civilized nations have 
sought to protect the graves of the dead and 
prevent the illegal removal of dead bodies 
for the purposes of sale, dissection, or from 
mere wantonness. * Civilized countries have 
always recognized and protected, as sacred, 
the right to . . .an undisturbed repose of 
the human body when buried.' 
Davis v. State. 6 S.E.2d 736, 737 (Ga. App. 1939)(citation 
omitted). Both of these rationales reflect widely-held societal 
values. £££, e»g», 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 10 (1966); 22A Am. 
Jur. 2d Dead Bodies § 70 (1988); 21 A.L.R.2d at 476-77. Courts 
in Utah have on several occasions underscored the importance of 
maintaining the sanctity of the grave, barring a strong showing 
that the interests of justice require disinterment. See Covert 
v. Kennecott Copper Corp.. 23 Utah 252, 254-55, 461 P.2d 466, 
468-69 (Utah 1969)(noting the custom of mankind is to treat the 
dead with %%utmost consideration ranging from a high degree of 
respect to reverence1* and that a violation of respect due to the 
dead offends ^generally accepted standards of decency")/ Silver 
14 
King Coalition Mines Co. v. Tndus. Comm'n. 115 Utah 336# 340-41, 
204 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 1949) (refusing to disturb the sanctity of 
the grave and a body once suitably buried except under 
circumstances of extreme exigency). 
In 1973, the grave robbing statutes were removed from the 
code chapter governing cemeteries-6 The 1898 disinterment 
statutes evolved into section 76-9-704, recodified in chapter 9, 
governing offenses against public order and decency: 
Abuse of a corpse.--(1) A person is guilty of 
abuse of a corpse if he intentionally and 
unlawfully: 
(a) Removes, conceals, dissects, or 
destroys a corpse or any part thereof: 
or 
(b) Disinters a corpse that has been 
buried or otherwise interred. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1973). 
While the 1973 recodification changed the structure and 
wording of the 1898 statutes, there is no indication that the 
essential purposes underlying the law changed. Indeed, the 
removal of the statutes from the cemetery chapter fairly implies 
that the legislature no longer intended them to be limited to 
disinterments that occur within cemeteries. As of 1973, then, 
6
 Chapter 8, the primary chapter devoted to cemeteries, now 
focuses largely on the maintenance and regulation of cemeteries. 
15 
the ambit of the statute would reasonably include disinterments 
that occurred outside established cemeteries as well.7 
The final change in the statute occurred in 1987 as a result 
of a highly-publicized murder case involving abuse of a corpse, 
which prompted a state senator to seek a more expansive statute 
with increased penalties. Outraged Senator Proposes Felony 
Penalty for Abuse of Dead. Salt Lake Trib., Nov. 17# 1987 at Bl. 
Now, in its entirety, the statute governing abuse or desecration 
of a dead human body goes well beyond the original, limited 
purposes of the 1898 law. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1995) 
or addendum A. Notably, however, the informations in this case 
charged that defendants Mid disinter a buried or otherwise 
interred dead body, without authority of a court order," language 
taken verbatim from section 76-9-704(1) (b), the direct descendant 
of the 1898 grave-robbing statutes.8 
The basic, unchanged policy underlying section 76-9-704, 
7
 The 1973 recodification also changed the phrase Mead 
body" to ^corpse." Subsequently, the word was changed again, 
this time to Mead human body." Absent any authority to the 
contrary, all three terms are treated synonymously here. 
8
 Notably, the annotations to all three versions of the 
statute, including the most recent, reference an American Law 
Reports article on the construction and application of grave 
robbing statutes. 
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dating back to 1898, is to discourage anyone from knowingly 
disturbing an interred dead human being absent a lawful purpose, 
regardless of the condition of the remains. The guiding 
principles are that all humans owe respect to those members of 
our species who have gone before us, regardless of when they died 
or in what condition their remains happen to be, and that 
desecration of dead humans constitutes criminal conduct. 
Consequently, any person who knowingly and unlawfully disinters 
the dead would be culpable under section 76-9-704. 
This statutory interpretation is consistent with decisions 
from other jurisdictions that also construe Mead human body" in 
light of statutory purposes. £££, e.g.> State v. Duncan, 369 
S.E.2d 464, 466-67 (W. Va. 1988) (concluding that statute which 
prohibited "unlawful disinterment of dead human bodies" did not 
require body first be decently or lawfully buried in light of 
statute's express language and legislature's desire not to 
distinguish between the types of graves which might be subject to 
unlawful disinterment); Davis v. State. 6 S.E.2d 736, 739 (Ga. 
App. 1939) (construing law against removal of Mead bodies" to 
include removal of "any part thereof/1 where defendant removed 
skull with gold teeth from skeleton and purpose of law was to 
prevent grave robbing); People v. Baumaartner. 66 P. 974, 975 
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(Cal. 1901) (interpreting phrase "to disinter a buried human 
body" to mean exposing the body and removing it from the ground, 
given the aim of the state body-snatching statute); Meads v. 
Dougherty County. 25 S.E. 915, 915 (Ga. 1896) (holding a few 
bleached bones washed on shore did not constitute a Mead body" 
for purposes of a statute requiring an inquest when a dead body 
indicates death by violence or under suspicious circumstances); 
but see Carter v. Zanesville, 52 N.E. 126, 127 (Ohio 1898) 
(holding terms "body" and "corpse," as used in statute penalizing 
persons having unlawful possession of a dead body, do not include 
remains of persons long buried and decomposed given object of the 
statute was to secure interment and respect for human remains). 
2. Section 76-9-704 should be read to be internally 
consistent and to be in harmony with other related statutes. 
*[A] fundamental rule of statutory construction requires 
that a statute %be looked at in its entirety and in accordance 
with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished.'" State v. 
Scieszka. 897 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah App. 1995)(quoting Salt Lake 
City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977)). A 
reviewing court, therefore, must ensure that the preliminary 
hearing court's interpretation of section 76-9-704 is both 
internally consistent and in harmony with related statutes, gee 
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State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 468 (Utah 1988), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). 
Section 76-9-704 delineates the four categories of conduct 
that constitute abuse or desecration of a dead human body, and 
then articulates certain acts that do not fall within its ambit 
(2) A person does not commit an offense under 
this section if when he directs or carries 
out procedures regarding a dead human body, 
he is acting lawfully under any of the 
following provisions: 
Funeral Services License Act; 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act; 
Utah Medical Examiner Act; 
Utah Medical Practices Act. . .; 
Use of Dead Bodies for Medical Purposes; 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
or 
(f) . . . Antiquities 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(2) (addendum A) .9 Of relevance to this 
case is subsection (2)(f), referring to the Antiquities Act, is 
of particular relevance to this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 9-8-
301 to -308 (1996). 
5
 This section's reference to one who %%directs or carries 
out procedures'' may be read to indicate that the statute only 
exempts conduct and persons that are otherwise regulated by other 
statutes. That is, persons such as medical doctors, funeral 
directors, anthropologists or archaeologists all have medical or 
scientific purposes underlying their conduct. They are not 
disinterring the dead for personal amusement or pecuniary gain. 
Logically, any other persons and all other conduct not covered by 
the exceptions would necessarily fall within the ambit of section 
76-9-704. 
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To evaluate the correctness of the court's interpretation of 
section 76-9-704(1), this court first assesses whether the 
interpretation is consistent with other parts of the same 
statute. "In cases of apparent conflict between provisions of 
the same statute, it is this Court's duty to harmonize and 
reconcile statutory provisions, since the Court cannot presume 
that the legislature intended to create a conflict." Madsen v. 
Brown. 701 P.2d 1086, 1089-90 (Utah 1985). 
Here, the preliminary hearing court determined that "some 
time after a person is buried and one thousand years later, a 
'dead body' becomes 'remains'" (R. 49 or addendum B). This 
ruling implies that Mead bodies" and "remains" are mutually 
exclusive categories. That is, an individual dies and for an 
uncertain amount of time, the corpse is a "dead body," protected 
from abuse or desecration under section 76-9-704. Somewhere 
along the line, however, whether through the passage of time or 
the forces of nature, the "dead body" becomes something lesser, 
which the court labeled "remains" and which do not come within 
the statute's protection. If this is, indeed, the correct 
interpretation of section 76-9-704, then the exceptions to the 
statute must also address "dead human bodies," rather than the 
separate category of "remains." 
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A close look at the Antiquities Act, the exception 
applicable to this case, reveals relevant references only to the 
term "specimen," rather than to either Mead human body" or 
"remains." The Antiquities Act, however, defines "specimen" as 
"all man-made artifacts and remains of an archaeological or 
anthropological nature found on or below the surface of the 
earth, excluding structural remains." Utah Code Ann. § 9-8-
302(13) (1996). The Antiquities Act, then, addresses 
archaeological or anthropological remains, not "dead human 
bod? ^ s." 
If the preliminary hearing court had been correct in 
differentiating "remains" from "dead human body" and in 
concluding that the term "dead human body" does not include 
"remains," then there would be no reason to list the Antiquities 
Act as an exception to section 76-4-709 because the Antiquities 
Act, by its own express terms, applies to "remains" and, hence --
according to the preliminary hearing court, at least -- would not 
apply to "dead human bodies." 
Because the preliminary hearing court's reading of section 
76-9-704 renders the statute's Antiquities Act exception mere 
surplusage, another more reasonable interpretation must be 
sought. State v. Hunt. 906 P.2d 311, 313-14 (Utah 1995) 
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(rejecting an interpretation of a statute that obviates the 
distinction between two terms, rendering one surplusage); Downey 
State Bank v. Maior-Blakenev Corp.. 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 
1978)(statutes should be read so as to avoid making any one of 
their provisions "surplusage and meaningless"); Ferro v. Utah 
Dep't of Commerce. 828 P.2d 507, 513-14 (Utah App. 1992) 
(rejecting an interpretation of an act which would render one of 
its provisions a nullity). Examination of a related statute, the 
Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act ("NAGPRA"), 
provides the guidance necessary to resolve the conflict inherent 
in the preliminary hearing court's approach. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 9-9-401 to -406 (1996) . 
NAGPRA, which governs the ownership and disposition of 
Native American remains and criminalizes illegal trafficking in 
such remains, defines the term "remains" as "all or part of a 
physical individual and objects on or attached to the physical 
individual that are placed there as part of the death rite or 
ceremony of a culture." Utah Code Ann. § 9-9-402(7) (1996). The 
definition of "remains" articulated in NAGPRA is consistent with 
the purposes of the Act --to protect Native American graves and 
ensure that any Native American remains unearthed on state lands 
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will be returned to their rightful owners.10 For purposes of 
NAGPRA, then, no legal distinction is drawn between a dead human 
body or any part of a dead human body.11 The same grave 
protection policy applies to desecration of the dead, regardless 
of the passage of time, the condition of the remains, or the race 
of the dead. 
Adopting NAGPRA's approach of treating all human remains 
equally and of declining to engage in the impossible line-drawing 
advocated by the preliminary hearing court in differentiating 
Mead human body" from ^remains" makes good sense, especially in 
light of the common purposes shared by NAGPRA and section 76-9-
10
 Traditional beliefs and practices teach that Native 
Americans "'have an inherent responsibility to care for those who 
are no longer alive. When a body goes into the ground, it is 
meant to stay there until the end of time. When remains are 
disturbed and remain above the ground, their spirits are at 
unrest. . . . These beliefs teach [Native Americans] to treat 
those who they share this life with and those who have left them 
to become a part of the Earth with the utmost respect.'" 
Bonnichsen v. United States. 1997 WL 366799 at 1 (D. Or. 
1997)(quoting Joint Tribal Amici Memorandum at 4-5). 
11
 The only Utah statutory definition of *part" is 
contained in the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which defines the 
term as "an organ, tissue, eye, Jbone, blood vessel, blood, fluid, 
or other portion of a human body." Utah Code Ann. § 26-28-
2(7)(Supp. 1997)(emphasis added). Recent amendments to Title 26, 
the Health Code, ^standardized various references to human 
remains as "dead body or" dead fetus.1' See, e.g. . id. at § 26-2-
16, Amendment Notes (Supp. 1997). 
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704.12 While NAGPRA is specifically aimed at protecting Native 
American gravesites and section 76-9-704 has its origins in 
protecting against grave-robbing, both share a common foundation 
in the belief that the dead deserve to lie undisturbed. 
Similarly, both share common histories of financial exploitation 
resulting from disinterment of the dead.13 Applying NAGPRA's 
policy-based approach to section 76-9-704 renders that statute 
internally consistent and in harmony with both the Antiquities 
Act and NAGPRA. For purposes of all three laws, the kinds of 
remains that are unearthed merit no legal distinctions. 
3. The preliminary hearing court's interpretation of Mead 
human body," as applied, is so unworkable and so racist in 
its impact as to render that interpretation contrary to 
public policy. 
"Relevant policy considerations" also help guide statutory 
12
 Such an approach also creates a bright-line rule, which 
courts can easily and even-handedly apply. 
13
 Grave-robbing, an evil well documented in the English 
common law, was not unusual in the earlier days of this country. 
£££, e-g-- PaVlS V. State/ 6 S.E. 2d 736 (Ga. App. 1939) 
(defendant removed skull to harvest gold teeth). Nonetheless, in 
a recent case, one federal court noted that it *is not aware of 
any significant market in cultural objects and remains stolen 
from predominantly Caucasian graveyards in the United States, or 
of museums exhibiting and cataloguing thousands of Caucasian 
skeletons, or of any parallel to the 'pot-hunters' who vandalize 
and desecrate Indian graves." Bonnichsen v. United States. 1997 
WL 366799, at *19 (D.Or. 1997)(citation omitted). 
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interpretation. World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 
879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994). In dismissing the felony charges 
against defendants, the preliminary hearing court determined that 
the statute was inapplicable because "in the eyes of the 
legislature, some time after a person is buried and one thousand 
years later, a *dead body' becomes ^remains'" (R. 49). In its 
oral ruling, the court opined that the statute was intended "to 
keep the people from digging around in graveyards" (R. Ill). 
From a practical standpoint, then, the preliminary hearing court 
limited the statute's applicability to established cemeteries. 
Such an interpretation offends public policy. The 
preliminary hearing court's interpretation of "dead human body" 
suggests that either the decomposition of the corporeal being or 
simply the passage of time change a "dead human being" into 
"remains" and, thus, at whatever point this occurs, section 76-9-
704(1) becomes inapplicable. 
If passage of time was the test for determining whether 
human remains constituted a "dead human body" for purposes of 
section 76-9-704, disinterring the recently dead would be a 
felony, while disinterring those dead for some unspecified longer 
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period of time would not.14 Thus, those buried "recently" in 
Utah -- for example, pioneers buried in established Anglo 
cemeteries -- would be protected, and the law would punish 
violators as a felony. In contrast, those buried "long ago" --
for example, the ancient peoples who lived here centuries ago and 
were buried in ways customary to their culture but foreign to 
modern peoples -- would not be so protected. The obvious racism 
inherent in such an interpretation renders it contrary to both 
common sense and public policy. There is no reason to surmise 
that the legislature intended such a result. 
Similarly, if the degree of decomposition were the test for 
whether human remains constituted a "dead human body" for 
purposes of section 76-9-704, a perpetrator's culpability would 
be dependent upon what was discovered in the burial site, rather 
than on the criminal act of disinterring. That is, if one dug 
into a burial site and found a relatively intact body, one could 
14
 Other lesser penalties, for acts related to but not as 
serious as the actual disinterment, are available pursuant to 
other statutes. See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann § 9-8-302 et seq. (The 
Antiquities Act, which punishes the act of excavating on state 
lands without a permit as a class B misdemeanor); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 9-4-401 et seq. (Native American Grave Protection and 
Repatriation Act, which punishes illegal trafficking in remains 
as a class A misdemeanor or, subsequently, as a third degree 
felony). 
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be convicted of abuse or desecration of a dead human body, 
regardless of the passage of time since death. If, however, 
conditions were such that the body had decomposed or the skeleton 
had been ravaged, one could not be so charged. This approach, 
however, runs afoul of a fundamental societal value -- respect 
for the dead and the sanctity of leaving human remains 
undisturbed. Logically, the criminal act should turn on the act 
of disinterring, not on what happens to be found once the 
disinterment is complete. 
The preliminary hearing court's interpretation of section 
76-9-704 is also premised on a faulty policy assumption. In 
orally articulating its ruling, the court stated: Ml]f these had 
been on Mr. Guymon's property they would have been --it would 
not [have] been permissible to disturb them, and I'xr thinking of 
all the farmers that have run their plows across lands and 
disturbed human remains" (R. 110 or addendum C). 
The court, however, ignored a critical element of the 
statute -- that the desecration, whether on public or private 
land, must be intentional in order to be a felony.15 See Utah 
15
 It must also be ^unlawful." Hence, if the excavation 
was done pursuant to a permit issued under the Antiquities Act, 
the digger would be insulated from liability. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 9-8-305 (2) (a); £££ also Utah Code Ann. § 9-9-403 (3) (a) . 
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Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1). Plainly, an unintentional unearthing of 
human remains would not be punishable as a felony. All the law 
seeks to do under those circumstances is to require reporting. 
fi££ Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(3); § 9-9-403 (4) (a) . Thus, the 
court's concern that a farmer who unintentionally unearths a 
human remain will become a felon is without foundation in the 
law. 
Finally, the preliminary hearing court's interpretation 
would leave a hole in the law that policy dictates should be 
filled. The Antiquities Act punishes surveying or excavating on 
state lands without a permit, violations of which are a class B 
misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 9-8-305. NAGPRA punishes 
illegal trafficking in Native American remains, making such 
conduct initially a class A misdemeanor and, subsequently, a 
third degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 9-9-404. Section 76-
9-704 punishes unlawful and intentional disinterment as a third 
degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(3). Defendants 
here acted without a permit, but did not traffic in remains. 
However, the gravamen of their crime was not merely acting 
(requiring permit issued under Antiquities Act in order to 
intentionally remove or excavate Native American remains from 
state land). 
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without a permit; it was their intentional and unlawful 
disinterring of the dead. Unless section 76-9-704 is read to 
include their intentional and unlawful conduct, the heinous part 
of their behavior will not be punishable under the law, 
4. When properly interpreted, section 76-9-704 mandates 
that defendants be bound over for intentionally and 
unlawfully disinterring Anasazi remains. 
In this case, there was ample evidence of defendants' 
intentional and unlawful act of disinterring the dead, gee 
State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991)(intent, usually not 
susceptible to proof by direct evidence, may be proven by 
circumstantial evidence). Here, defendants' intent was evidenced 
in a variety of ways. First, their vehicle, which was parked 
near the dig site, bore vanity license plates emblazoned with the 
single word, "ANASAZI" (R. 71). A fair implication from the 
license plate is that the owners had a significant interest in 
and knowledge of the Anasazi culture. Second, defendants' 
children, standing nearby, openly acknowledged that their parents 
were digging (Id.). The fair inference from this fact is that 
the parents, who were out of sight at the dig location, told the 
children they were going to dig. Third, the children described 
the event as a "family outing" (Id.). A fair inference from this 
statement is that the activities were not uncommon for the 
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family, but more on the line of a weekend picnic. Fourth, the 
site at which defendants were digging was a known Anasazi site, 
complete with a recognizable midden area (R. 100). A fair 
inference from this fact is that defendants knew where they were 
digging and, indeed, chose to dig there precisely because it was 
an Anasazi burial site, where items of value could be expected to 
be found near the deceased.16 Fifth, when apprehended at the 
scene, defendants asserted that their acts occurred on private 
land (R. 71). A fair inference from this fact is that defendants 
knew that if the archaeological site at which they had been 
caught digging was located on public land, they would be 
criminally culpable for trespass on trust lands, gee Utah Code 
Ann. § 53C-2-30K1) (f) (Supp. 1994). Finally, there was no 
evidence that defendants had secured permits that would render 
their actions lawful. See Utah Code Ann. § 9-8-305(2) (a); § 9-9-
403(3) (a) (1996) . 
The preliminary hearing court found probable cause to 
16
 The court may take judicial notice of the pecuniary 
value of Anasazi remains, both corporeal and material. See. 
e.g./ United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1417, 1420 (10th 
Cir. 1997)(noting that defendant, convicted under federal law for 
looting an Anasazi site in San Juan County, Utah, had discussed 
*his experience in finding archeological artifacts and his 
experience in making large amounts of money selling those 
[Anasazi] artifacts"). 
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believe that defendants disturbed or disinterred human remains 
and failed to bind over only because it misinterpreted the 
applicable statute. However, where the evidence showed that 
defendants were intentionally and unlawfully digging in a known 
Anasazi burial site, and where there is no dispute that they 
disinterred human remains, their conduct properly fell within the 
ambit of section 76-9-704, as that law is interpreted in light of 
legislative history, statutory consistency, and public policy. 
When section 76-9-704 is correctly interpreted and applied to the 
facts of this case, the preliminary hearing court's finding of 
probable cause supports an order binding defendants over to 
district court to stand trial on the felony charges. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court &.. /uld vacate the order 
of dismissal issued by the preliminary hearing court, reinstate 
the felony information, and order that defendants be bound over 
to district court to stand trial for abuse or desecration of a 
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dead human body, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-9-704. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 25. daY o f August, 1997. 
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Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
76-9-704. Abuse or desecration of a dead human body — 
Penalties. 
(1) A person is guilty of abuse or desecration of a dead human body if the 
person intentionally and unlawfully: 
(a) removes, conceals, fails to report the finding of a dead body to a local 
law enforcement agency, or destroys a dead body or any part of it; 
(b) disinters a buried or otherwise interred dead body, without author-
ity of a court order; 
(c) dismembers a dead body to any extent, or damages or detaches any 
part or portion of a dead body; or 
(d) commits, or attempts to commit upon any dead body sexual pen-
etration or intercourse, object rape, sodomy, or object sodomy, as these acts 
are described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the Person. 
(2) A person does not commit an offense under this section if when he directs 
or carries out procedures regarding a dead human body, he is acting lawfully 
under any of the following provisions: 
(a) Title 58, Chapter 9, Funeral Service License Act; 
(b) Title 26, Chapter 28, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act; 
(c) Title 26, Chapter 4, Utah Medical Examiner Act; 
(d) Title 58, Chapter 12, Part 5, Utah Medical Practice Act, which 
concerns licensing to practice medico; 
(e) Title 53B, Chapter 17, Part c, Use of Dead Bodies for Medical 
Purposes; or 
(f) Title 9, Chapter 8, Pail 3, Antiquities. 
(3) Abuse or desecration of a dead human body is a third degree felony 
except failing to report a finding of a human body is a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-9-704, enacted by L. made corrections and changes in the style of the 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-9-704; 1988, ch. 53, § 1; chapter references in Subsections (IXd) and (2). 
1991, ch. 241, 5 102; 1992, ch. 241, § 375. The 1992 amendment, effective March 13, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- 1992, substituted the reference to Title 9, Chap-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted ter 8, Part 3 for a reference to §§ 63-18-18 
"class B" for "class A" in Subsection (3) and through 63-18-31 in Subsection (2Xf). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 22AAm. Jur. 2d Deac5 Bodies 
§ 109. 
CJS. — 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 10. 
AXJt — Construction and application of 
grave-robbing statutes, 52 A.L.R.3d 701. 
Liability for desecration of graves and tomb-
stones, 77 A.L.R.4th 108. 
Key Numbers. — Dead Bodies *» 7. 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
«•> APR - 1 1997 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY — -
DEPUTY 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, 8TATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES REDD and JEANNE REDD, 
Defendants. j 
FINDINGS £ ORDER 
Case Nos. 9617-229 and 
9617-230 
The Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses and 
considered the brief submitted by counsel for Dr. and Mrs. Redd, 
makes the following findings and order, based upon the evidence 
presented today. 
1. Probable cause is found as to the trespass count. 
2. The state presented evidence that defendants, in the 
process of searching for archeological artifacts, disturbed human 
bones and bone fragments. The state has not shown that the bones 
were in their original place of repose before they were disturbed 
by defendants. 
3. The legislature has addressed the excavation of artifacts 
and human remains in Title 9, Chapter 8 and 9, Utah Code (1996), 
and carefully avoided regulating, without the owner's consent, the 
excavation of artifacts and human remains on private property. 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
STATE VS REDD AND REDD 
CASE NO 9617-229 &230 
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4. The section under which defendants are charged with 
desecration of a corpse does not define "burial11, "interment" or 
"dead body". 
5. Title 9, Chapter 9, Utah Code (1996) refers to portions 
of an individual that are found in archaeological sites as 
"remains". 
6. Reading Section 76-9-704 and Title 9, Chapters 8 & 9 
together, the court concludes that in the eyes of the legislature, 
some time after a person is buried and one thousand years later, a 
"dead body" becomes "remains". 
7. The statues clearly evidence a legislative intent to 
avoid regulation of private excavation of archaeological sites on 
private land unless the owner has consented to regulation. 
8. The interpretation argued by the state in this case would 
extend Section 76-9-704 to all private lands in Utah, contrary to 
legislative intent, and make it a felony for private persons to 
disturb one thousand year old remains on their own lands. 
9. With the consent of defendants, the misdemeanor trespass 
is held in abeyance for six months, for a status hearing as to the 
felony, which this Court refuses to bind over for trial for the 
reasons herein stated. 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the charge of desecration of a 
corpse against each defendant is dismissed. 
DATED this 151 f^lay of April, 1997. 
Lyle/RT Anderson, 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of the 
foregoing FINDINGS AND ORDER, postage prepaid, to the following: 
William Benge 
Deputy County Attorney 
125 East Center 
Moab, UT 84532 
Rod W. Snow 
Dixon & Snow, P.C. 
425 S. Cherry Street., #1000 
Denver, CO 80222 
DATE 
William L. Schultz 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 137 
Moab, UT 84532 
this X& day of April, 1997. 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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STATE RESTS 
THE COURT: Any evidence from the defense? 
MR. SNOW: No, thank you. 
THE COURT: All right, do you wish to present 
argument? I have reviewed your Memorandum. 
MR. SNOW: Judge, I would simply incorporate the 
Memorandum at this point in interest of time, I know you have a 
heavy docket. 
THE COURT: Mr. Benge? 
MR. BENGE: Your Honor, I'll submit it, I — I haven't 
had a chance to read the Memorandum, it was just handed to me 
before court, so I really not gonna comment on this time, I'll submit 
it. 
THE COURT: From the evidence that's been presented 
here, I find that there is probable cause to believe that the 
defendant's did trespass on state trust lands, I also find probable 
cause to believe that they — that they did disturb these — or even 
disinterred these remains. Whether that constitutes a criminal 
offense of desecration of a corpse, or abuse or desecration of a dead 
human body is what's addressed in the defendant's Memorandum and 
these are remains that presumably are a thousand years old. I guess 
there's one school of thought that It doesn't matter how old the 
remains are, they're still human remains, and they need to be 
protected from being disturbed. Under that theory, if these had been 
on Mr. Guymon's property they would have been — it would not been 
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a permissible to disturb them, and I'm thinking of ail the farmers that 
have run their plows across lands and — and disturbed human 
remains. The other — the other — and — and these are human 
remains that are entitled to respect, these — these people probably 
have descendants living today who care that they be treated with 
respect. The descendant's of these people probably are the Pueblo 
Indians, if — if any descendants exist. 
The other school of thought is, "Hey wait a minute, you know, 
there's a rule of reason that has to apply here, we're talking about 
disturbing human remains that have been buried in a place that's 
been set aside for the preserving of human remains, the cemetery 
and — and there has to be a certain point when we can't— we can't 
hold people guilty for a — of a Third Degree Felony because they — 
they don't avoid all of these human remains and — and these remain 
are scattered all over this part of the country. I presume all over the 
world this situation exists. 
And I don't know — really I don't know the answer to the 
question. There's these two philosophies, both of them entitled to 
legitimate treatment. Both — both of them legitimate and entitled to 
respect. But, I have to decide as a magistrate, whether I will bind 
over and hold the — the Redd's for trial on these charges. If I hold 
them over for trial, they'll go to — they'll go to trial, they'll endure th 
expense and the trauma of a — of a trial on a felony charge. Citizen, 
of this county will be summoned in to try the case, and the state will 
be put to considerable expense to try the case. And, It may go up on 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
M. Jane Musselman 
Certified Court Transcriber 
P.O. Box 531 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Telephone: (801) 587-2351 
appeal and the Supreme Court will tell us, "Wait a minute." Or the 
Court of Appeals will say, "Wait a minute, we didn't — we didn't thini 
this - we don't think this statute intended to extend this far." 
And this is a statute that as you read the statute in it's entirety, 
think clearly in — clearly evidences a legislative intent to keep the 
people from digging around in graveyards. You gotta report the bod^ . 
you can't disinter it or, you can't dismember it or damage it. You 
can't commit any of these unspeakable acts on a dead body. The 
Supreme Court may say, "Well, you know, we weren't talking — the 
statute wasn't talking about this kind of a situation." 
And if I — if I dismiss the charges, fail to bind over, then the 
state could take an appeal, the Supreme Court can tell us what the 
law is on this case, and we'll — we won't be disturbing the citizens of 
the county, we won't be putting Dr. and Mrs. Redd to the trauma of i 
trial without knowing that that's what the law is, by an authoritative 
source. And what I think about this isn't gonna matter when the 
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court reviews this. It's gonna be — 
they will give my decision no deference whatsoever. 
And so I am going to — I am not going to bind over on the felon 
charges, I will dismiss those charges and while indicating as I have, 
my factual findings are that they did disinter these remains. And if 
that amounts to this offense, then this case should be sent back for 
trial, and I should be ordered — reversed and ordered to bind the 
defendant's over. Now that puts us in a kind of a strange procedural 
position on the second counts of the Informations, and what I'm goin. 
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to suggest is that we stay any further proceedings on those until the 
state has an opportunity to take an appeal and we get a decision on 
that, either the state — well, until we get a decision on that. 
Is that agreeable with your clients, Mr. Snow? 
MR. SNOW: Very much so, Judge and I appreciate the| 
court's analysis. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BENGE: Thank you, Your Honor that would be 
fine. 
THE COURT: Mr. Snow, it will be up to you and Mr. 
Schultz to prepare an Order putting into — putting on paper the 
court's decision here. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Any other findings, Judge you said 
that your findings is that they did disinter? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Anything else you want in the Order? 
I — I made notes. 
THE COURT: All right, does anyone need Exhibit One 
and Two back? 
MR. BENGE: I would like them returned, Your Honor. 
MR. SCHULTZ: No objection to that, Judge. 
THE COURT: Exhibit's One and Two returned to Mr. 
Benge. Just to make sure we don't lose track of this case, let's set a 
date six months from now when the defendant's will be back here, or 
at least will have a report, and set a future date — so we haven't yet 
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